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JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURTS
OF ILLINOIS. II*
CECIL BRONSTON'1"
PLACE OF PROBATE COURTS IN JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS
Exclusive Jurisdiction
A S PREVIOUSLY seen, probate courts are courts of record
of general jurisdiction when adjudging upon the ad-
ministration of estates, but are of limited jurisdiction when
compared with certain other courts of the state in that they
can exercise only such powers as are expressly granted or
such further powers as are by implication necessary to carry
out the powers expressly granted.
In all probate matters and the settlement of estates of de-
ceased persons, the probate court has original jurisdiction . 52
It has exclusive jurisdiction in the granting of administra-
tions and the allowing of wills. 15 3  In ordinary cases, it has
exclusive jurisdiction of the administration proper of estates,
although under extraordinary circumstances a court of equi-
ty may assume and exercise jurisdiction which is paramount
to that of the probate court."" Under such circumstances,
* For the first part of this article, see 18 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 248.
t Member of the Illinois Bar, Assistant Secretary, Trust Department, Continen-
tal Illinois National Bank & Trust Company.
152 Healea v. Verne, 343 Ill. 325, 175 N.E. 562 (1931); Stevenson v. Montgomery,
263 Ill. 93, 104 N.E. 1075, Ann. Cases 1915C 112 (1914).
153 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence (Boston: Little,
Brown & Co., 12th ed., 1877) I, 525, note 1: "Courts in equity can neither grant ad-
ministration, nor allow a will, nor will they interfere with the judgment of the
proper courts in granting administration or allowing wills," citing Case of Broder-
ick's Will, 21 Wall. 503, 22 L. Ed. 599 (1875), and Jairus W. Perry, A Treatise on the
Law of Trusts and Trustees (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 6th ed., 1911) 1, H 182,
183 and 184.
154 Chapman v. American Surety Co., 261 Ill. 594, 104 N.E. 247 (1914). The court
said: "This court, in Howell v. Moores, 127 Ill. 67, in discussing the jurisdiction of
probate courts, held that under the constitution circuit courts had original jurisdic-
tion in all cases at law and in equity, therefore the jurisdiction conferred upon the
county or probate courts was concurrent only with that previously existing in the
circuit courts in matters of trust; that under the constitution this equitable juris-
diction could not be taken from the courts of equity by the legislature. This court
has more than once stated that courts of equity have a paramount jurisdiction in
matters of administration and settlement of estates.... The rule now appears to
be that courts of equity will not exercise jurisdiction over the administration of
estates in ordinary cases." For further development of this subject, see, infra,
"Jurisdiction in Relation to Circuit and Superior Courts."
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the court of equity may take over the entire administra-
tion,"' but ordinarily it will confine itself to questions arising
in the course of the administration between parties interested
in the estate and not attempt to set up an administration of
itself. 156
The probate court's sole original jurisdiction to probate
wills 1" 7 contemplates not only the determination that the in-
strument probated as a will is valid in its execution by the
prima facie proof required by the statute, but also the deter-
mination of whether events occurring subsequent to its exe-
cution are sufficient to invalidate and revoke it. In other
words, the jurisdiction to probate wills includes the jurisdic-
tion to determine the validity of the wills offered for pro-
bate. 5 " And, together with the probating of a will, it is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court to establish a
lost or destroyed will. 159 Further, the probate court has the
exclusive right to grant letters testamentary and letters of
administration, 6 and the regularity of the appointment of
an executor or administrator cannot be questioned in a col-
lateral proceeding.'61 The jurisdiction over the estate of a
deceased person is a continuing jurisdiction which remains
with the probate court until the estate is finally closed and
distributed to the parties entitled to such distribution.6 2
Of course, references in this paper to exclusive jurisdic-
tion mean only that in the original instance such jurisdiction
is exclusive." 3 Appeals from final orders or decrees of the
155 Grattan v. Grattan, 18 Ill. 167 (1856); Townsend v. Radcliffe, 44 Il. 446
(1867).
156 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, I, 525, note 1; Jones and Cunningham, Practice
(Chicago: T. H. Flood & Co., 4th ed., 1918) I, 5.
157 Schofield v. Thomas, 231 Ill. 114, 83 N.E. 121 (1907); Beatty v. Clegg, 214 InI.
34, 73 N.E. 383 (1905); People v. Knickerbocker, 114 II. 539, 2 N.E. 507 (1885); Wild,
Ex'r v. Sweeney, 84 Ill. 213 (1876).
158 Research Hospital v. Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co., 352 Ill. 510, 186
N.E. 170 (1933).
159 Mather v. Minard, 260 Ill. 175, 102 N.E. 1062 (1913).
160 Kennedy v. Kennedy, 105 Ill. 350 (1883).
161 People v. Salornan, 184 Ill. 490, 56 N.E. 815 (1900); Golder v, Bressler, 105
I. 419 (1883).
162 In re Turner's Estate, 275 IlM. App. 366 (1934); Hodson v. Hodson, 277 Ill. 137,
115 N.E. 159 (1917), affirming 201 II. App. 412 (1916).
163 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, I, 526, note: "Generally all errors in the pro-
ceedings in the settlement of estates, in surrogate or probate court, can be cor-
rected on appeal; and appeal is the proper remedy," rather than recourse to
equity.
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probate court in a proceeding for the sale of real estate may
be taken to the appellate or supreme court of the state6 4 and
appeals from any other orders, judgments, or decrees may
be taken to the circuit court. 16 5 On appeal to the circuit court
the trial is de novo and from this trial lie further appeals, if
desired, to the appellate and supreme courts-all as in other
civil cases in courts of record.
Jurisdiction in Relation to County Courts
Reference to the relationship between probate and county
courts has already been made to some extent in Chapter II. It
will be recalled that there are two classes of cases in which
county courts have jurisdiction: first, those enumerated in
Article VI, Section 18 of the constitution, and, second, those
cases where jurisdiction is specially conferred on county
courts by the enactment of a general law authorized and per-
mitted by said article; whereas the jurisdiction of probate
courts is limited to those cases specifically enumerated in
Article VI, Section 20 of the Illinois Constitution.166 Conse-
quently the jurisdiction of probate courts is not coextensive
with nor as large as the jurisdiction of county courts. 67
The relationship of these two courts on probate matters is
set forth clearly in Klokke v. Dodge:
. . . the establishment of a probate court, under the constitution, in a
particular county, is ipso facto a revocation of the jurisdiction of the
county court of such county as to all matters over which probate courts
are given jurisdiction, and with respect to which county courts in
counties not having probate courts exercise a similar jurisdiction, - or,
in other words, . . . the county court . . . is at once, by operation of
law, deprived of its jurisdiction in matters of probate, . . . for there is
no such thing . . . as concurrent jurisdiction between the two courts in
the same county. The jurisdiction of the . . . [probate] courts is clearly
exclusive. 168
Jurisdictional Relationship of Courts
of Probate of Different Counties
The Probate Act provides, when the will of a testator is
probated or when the estate of a decedent is administered in
164 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 483.
165 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 484.
166 Ante, pp. 266 et seq.
167 City of Moline v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 262 Ill. 52, 104 N.E. 204 (1914).
168 103 IMl. 125 (1882); also, Meserve Ex'x v. Delaney, 105 Ill. 53 (1882).
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Illinois, that the probate or the administration shall be in the
probate court of the county determined as follows:
(a) In the county where his mansion house is situated.
(b) If he has no mansion house in this state, in the county where he
has a known place of residence.
(c) If he has neither a mansion house nor a known place of residence
in this state, in the county wherein the greater portion of his real
estate is located.
(d) If he has no mansion house, no known place of residence, and no
real estate in this state, in the county where the greater part of
his personal estate is located at the time of his death. 169
Further, the act provides, for the purpose of granting ad-
ministration of both testate and intestate estates of nonresi-
dent decedents, the situs of tangible personal estate is where
it is located, and the situs of intangible personal estate is
where the instrument evidencing a debt, obligation, stock, or
chose in action happens to be, or where the debtor resides, if
there is no instrument in this state.170
There is little to be added from the cases to the plain
words of the statute. Of course, the first section referred to
applies solely to domestic estates, 71 and under former acts
of slightly different wording it has been held that jurisdiction
to admit wills to probate is, primarily, exclusive in the pro-
bate court for the district in which the testator was domiciled
at the time of his death. 172 The statement in Balsewicz v.
Chicago Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company17 3 that resi-
dence of the decedent at the time of his death within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the court is essential to the probate
court's jurisdiction now seems too broad.
But in any event it seems certain that where a court of
one county acquires jurisdiction over an estate, it retains
such jurisdiction until the estate is fully administered.174
169 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 206.
170 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 207.
171 Davis v. Upson, 230 IMI. 327, 82 N.E. 824 (1907); Upson v. Davis, 110 Ill. App.
375, reversed in 209 Ill. 206, 70 N.E. 602 (1904).
172 Wild, Ex'r v. Sweeney, 84 Ill. 213 (1876).
173 240 IM. 238, 88 N.E. 734 (1909), reversing 144 Ill. App. 219 (1908).
174 Dougherty v. Hughes, 165 IM. 384, 46 N.E. 229 (1897); People v. White, 11 III.
341 (1849).
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Jurisdiction in Relation to Circuit and Superior Courts1 7
Article VI, Section 12 of the Illinois Constitution provides:
"The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
causes in law and equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as is
or may be provided by law, and shall hold two or more terms
each year in every county." The original jurisdiction so con-
ferred upon circuit courts of all causes in law and equity is
unaffected by Section 20 of Article VI conferring original jur-
isdiction upon probate courts in all probate matters and the
settlement of estates, as it has been held that the legislature
has no power to abridge the original jurisdiction of circuit
courts.
176
At Law
Under this constitutional provision, circuit courts have
jurisdiction of actions against administrators and executors
to enforce the legal liabilities of the decedent "regardless of
the character or form of the action."' 17 7 A right of action at
law against a person while living remains a right of action of
the same nature against his legal representatives and may be
prosecuted in the circuit court as an action at law against the
administrator or executor, or may be filed in the court of pro-
bate as a claim against the estate.178 A judgment in either
court becomes a charge against the estate. 179 A judgment in
175 The Superior Court is existent in Cook County only. Provision for its estab-
lishment and jurisdiction is found in Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 23 and 24; and it has
the same jurisdiction and powers as the Circuit Court of Cook County, the two
courts really being identical except in name. See Berkowitz v. Lester, 121 Inl. 99,
11 N.E. 860 (1887); Cobe v. Guyer, 237 Ill. 516, 86 N.E. 1071 (1908), affirming 139 Ill.
App. 592 (19d8). Thus, references herein to the circuit court mean also the Supe-
rior Court of Cook County, and for the sake of brevity the latter court will not
further be mentioned by name.
176 Myers v. The People, 67 Ill. 503 (1873); People v. Feinberg, 348 Ill. 549, 181
N.E. 437 (1932).
177 Howard v. Swift, 356 Ill. 80, 88, 190 N.E. 102 (1934), which cites Darling v.
McDonald, 101 Ill. 370 (1882) ; Roberts v. Flatt, 142 Ill. 485, 32 N.E. 484 (1892) ; Morse
v. Pacific Railway Co., 191 Ill. 356, 61 N.E. 104 (1901); and Starrett v. Brosseau, 208
fll. 408, 70 N.E. 354 (1904).
178 Starrett v. Brosseau, supra. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 494: "In addition to
the actions which survive by the common law, the following also survive: actions
of replevin, action to recover damages for an injury to the person (except slander
or libel), actions to recover damages for an injury to real or personal property or
for the detention or conversion of personal property, actions against officers for
misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance of themselves or their deputies, and ac-
tions for fraud or deceit."
179 Morse v. Pacific Railway Co., 191 Ill. 356, 61 N.E. 104 (1901).
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the circuit court properly reads "to be paid in due course of
administration," which means that it shall be paid as, and
pro rata with, other claims of the same class, out of the assets
administered. Since the executors or administrators are par-
ties to the judgment they need no further notice of it. But the
court of probate should be informed of the existence of the
judgment in order that such court may properly discharge the
duty of causing settlement of the estate to be made, as other-
wise it could not intelligently pass upon the accounts and
could never know whether the estate was settled or not.
Therefore the judgment itself or a copy thereof should be filed
in the court of probate where it is to be taken as duly proven
and as a legal claim, to the extent it purports to be, against
the estate. The judgment is subject to no revision by such
court since the circuit court is of general original jurisdic-
tion.8 0 Conversely, executors and administrators resort to
the circuit court in its law branch to obtain legal remedies on
behalf of the estates they are administering.
In Chancery
In the chancery branch of the circuit court there is a
much broader concurrence of jurisdiction with that of the
probate court, for courts of equity may, in the exercise of
their general jurisdiction, take upon themselves the adminis-
tration of estates, supersede the jurisdiction of the probate
court, and take the whole administration into their hands. 181
However, in Illinois, as in the rest of the United States, courts
of equity seldom interfere in the administration of estates.
When they do it is only in aid of the courts of probate, and for
the accomplishment of some specific end not readily attain-
180 Darling et al. v. McDonald, 101 Ill. 370 (1882).
181 Grattan v. Grattan, 18 Ill. 167 (1856); Townsend v. Radcliffe, 44 Ill. 446 (1867).
Historically, the jurisdiction of courts of equity in the administration of estates is
founded on the principle that it is the duty of the court to enforce the execution of
trusts and that the executor or administrator is bound to apply the property in his
hands to the payments of debts and legacies and to apply the surplus according to
the will of the testator, or, in case of intestacy, according to the statute of distribu-
tion, a constructive trust thereby being created. Other auxiliary grounds are the
necessity of taking accounts, and compelling a discovery, and the consideration
that the remedy at law, when it exists, is not plain, adequate and complete. These
reasons are more English than American, for ordinarily courts of probate in this
country have ample powers, both in the extent of their jurisdiction and their mode
of procedure, for the accomplishment of the principal objects upon the attainment
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able in the courts of probate, after which the cause is remand-
ed to the probate court with the decree of the court of equity,
and becomes a part of the proceedings there, that the final
settlement of the estate may remain in that court .1 2 In Illi-
nois it has been said:
While in some of the earlier cases in this state it is held that
equity retains a general jurisdiction over administrators, concurrent with
that exercised by probate courts, yet the rule as now declared is, that
courts of equity will not exercise jurisdiction over the administration of
estates except in extraordinary cases; and by the liberal statutory rules
for the settlement of estates, based on equitable principles and enforced
in courts of probate, the reasons for equitable jurisdiction in such cases
are greatly restricted. Probate courts are established for the settlement
of such estates, and questions arising in the course of administration
are decided by them to the practical exclusion of the jurisdiction of
courts of equity."83
The test to be applied in determining whether a court of
equity will assume jurisdiction is whether the ordinary pow-
ers of the probate court are adequate to the protection and
enforcement of every right which is shown to exist in the par-
ties at interest. If special reasons can be shown why the court
of probate cannot afford the requisite relief, equity will as-
sist, but not otherwise.8  The difficulty, as is always
the case, comes in the application of the rule or test to the
particular circumstances of a case.
Facts which are severally insufficient to warrant the in-
terposition of a court of equity may together equal a compli-
cated sum that justifies the interposition. Such were the cir-
cumstances in Elting v. First National Bank.'15 The executrix
was guilty of neglect and mismanagement, but these, the
court said, were not of themselves sufficient to warrant the
intervention of equity. However, she had pyramided her
of which the English equity jurisdiction, in such matters, is founded. Story, Equity
Jurisprudence, I, §§ 532, 534 and 543a.
182 Woerner, American Law of Administration, I, 535 et seq.; Story, Equity
Jurisprudence, I, § 543a.
183 Goodman v. Kopperl, 169 IMl. 136, 48 N.E. 172 (1897); Elting v. First Nat.
Bank, 173 Ill. 368, 50 N.E. 1095 (1898); Winslow v. Leland, 128 Il. 304, 21 N.E. 588
(1889); Harris v. Douglas. 64 Ill. 466 (1872).
184 Freeland v. Dazey, 25 IlM. 266 (1861); Elting v. First Natl. Bank, 173 Ill. 368,
50 N.E. 1095 (1898). This test is in reality merely an application of the elemen-
tary principle that a court of equity will not intervene where there is an adequate
remedy at law, but the remedy at law must be pursued.
1s5 173 Ill. 368, 50 N.E. 1095 (1898).
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wrongs. Her bond was fraudulently insufficient; she had en-
tered into collusion with a claimant; through an intermediary
she had acquired title to real estate of the decedent sold os-
tensibly to pay debts-such acquisition being fraudulent per
se-and, finally, she had removed herself and personal assets
of the estate beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court by
leaving the state. The probate court could not grant the relief
necessary to the creditors, but the circuit court properly took
jurisdiction for that purpose.
The jurisdiction of the circuit court has also been upheld
to expedite and simplify the settlement of issues which were
within the province of the probate court but were directly in-
volved in matters properly initiated in a court of equity. In
Potter v. Clapp,8" the widow filed her bill against the chil-
dren of the decedent by a former marriage for the assign-
ment of dower and homestead, the establishment of a result-
ing trust in the realty to the extent her personal funds had
been used in its improvement subsequent to the decedent's
death, and an accounting. By leave of court, a divorced wife
of the decedent intervened as a claimant for dower. It was
held that there was no objection to a full settlement and ad-
justment in this suit of all claims or matters in difference rel-
ative to the estate nor to a full determination of the respec-
tive interests in the real estate, the improvements made, and
the rents received; because the complainant widow was the
only creditor, she and the defendants were the only persons
interested in the estate, the only asset was the real estate
subject to the suit, and any claims, widow's award, and ad-
ministration expense that were properly payable would have
to be paid from the income or sale of the real estate.
That courts of equity have peculiarly within their prov-
ince the enforcement of trusts is, of course, ample reason for
the circuit court to assume jurisdiction. Where, during life-
time, a decedent had received money as assignee, in trust, it
was held proper for his creditor to enforce the trust and ob-
tain an accounting in the circuit court despite a contention
that the creditor was limited to filing his claim in the probate
court. The court said that the statute providing for the filing
of claims, and establishing as one class of claims those
186 203 IM. 592, 68 N.E. 81 (1903).
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"where the decedent has received money in trust for any
purpose," confers upon the probate court jurisdiction which
is merely concurrent with the previously existing jurisdic-
tion of the circuit court in matters of trust, and the court
which first obtains jurisdiction will have precedence."8 7
For the same reason, where trustees were also executors
under a will, and during the executorship a loss was incurred
by reason of their negligence, it was held not to be an inter-
ference with the jurisdiction of the probate court for the cir-
cuit court to compel the trustees to make good the loss, even
though the estate was still pending before the probate
court.188 It has even been indicated that if a testator should
make the payment of his debts a charge upon real estate de-
vised by his will, using language showing a broader intent
than the ordinary provision for the payment of debts, such
language might be construed to establish a trust in the de-
visee for creditors which would furnish sufficient grounds for
a court of equity to take jurisdiction of the claim in the first
instance, without requiring its exhibition and establishment
in the probate court. 189
However, the application of the test of whether a com-
plainant may come into a court of chancery, or should obtain
relief in the probate court, more often than not has resulted in
a decision that the former court should not intervene.
It is well settled that a claimant may not, in the first in-
stance, file a bill to enforce the payment of a claim against an
estate. The statute has pointed out a different mode of pro-
cedure, and the claimant must pursue that remedy, which is
to exhibit his claim and have it allowed by the court of pro-
bate. Then, if any special reasons that may be deemed suf-
ficient can be assigned why that court cannot afford the requi-
site relief, equity will assist him, but not otherwise.1 There-
187 Howell v. Moores, 127 Il. 67, 19 N.E. 863 (1889). While the circuit court un-
doubtedly has jurisdiction it would still seem advisable to apprise the probate
court of the decree in order to aid it in the proper settlement of the estate.
188 Waterman et al. v. Alden, 144 Il. 90, 32 N.E. 972 (1893), holding that merely
because individuals are guilty of negligence as executors does not mean that they
are not also guilty as trustees, and that since they are "the same persons, it is
impossible that there should be an act of fraud, or breach of duty by the executors,
which is not consented to and acquiesced in by the trustees."
189 Harris v. Douglas, 64 I1. 466 (1872).
190 Blanchard v. Williamson, 70 IMI. 647 (1873); Harris v. Douglas, 64 I1. 466
(1872) ; Freeland v. Dazey, 25 II. 294 (1861) Armstrong v. Cooper, 11 11. 561 (1850).
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fore, the circuit court erred in assuming jurisdiction of a bill
to compel an executrix, after the expiration of the period of
administration and her discharge, to pay from uninventoried
assets a note alleged to have been made by the decedent, be-
cause the claimant could file her claim in the court of pro-
bate, and if it were allowed, obtain payment from such assets
as had not been inventoried. 191
Similarly, where a decedent owned only real estate and
no administration of his estate had been had, it was held that
a creditor should have compelled administration, as was his
statutory right, rather than bring a bill in equity against the
heirs. The court pointed out that the right to satisfaction of
debts from real estate is secondary, as the personalty must
first be exhausted, and asked how it was to be known whether
there was personalty or whether there were other creditors
to be satisfied without proceeding in the usual manner in the
probate court. 192
It has been held to be an insufficient reason for the inter-
vention of equity that an administrator was negligent or act-
ed fraudulently in failing to find and collect assets in the
hands of the surviving partner of an intestate person, 9' and
the same with reference to an administrator making false
and fraudulent reports to the court of probate as to the
191 Blanchard v. Williamson, 70 Ill. 647 (1873).
192 Garvin, Bell & Co. v. Stewart's Heirs, 59 ill. 229 (1871). It was held to the
same effect where the creditor sought to have set aside an allegedly fraudulent
conveyance made by the insolvent decedent during his lifetime so that the creditor
might satisfy his demand from the property. Scripps v. King, 103 Ill. 469 (1882).
Nor does it make any difference that the administrator fraudulently procured his
appointment as a creditor when in fact he was not a creditor, or that another claim
allowed is fraudulent, as the probate court has full power to deal with improperly
appointed administrators and possesses equitable powers, itself, sufficient to set
aside and disallow fraudulent claims. Strauss v. Phillips, 189 Ill. 9, 59 N.E. 560
(1901). Neither will a creditor's bill lie to reach insurance or premiums paid
thereon by an insolvent debtor, since deceased, when filed by a creditor holding a
simple promissory note which has never been allowed against estate of deceased
debtor in probate court. Houston v. Maddux, 179 Ill. 377, 53 N.E. 599 (1899). Nor
was it a case of equitable cognizance when an individual had been denied the
right to set off a claim purchased from a creditor of an estate against the pur-
chase price of land bought at an administrator's sale, such denial being rendered
by the circuit court in the sale proceedings and the probate court on subsequent
petition thereto. Thus, when he filed a bill in equity to relitigate the matters the
decision was he had had his day in court; he should have appealed. Harding v.
Shepard, 107 IMl. 264 (1883).
193 Winslow v. Leland, 128 Ill. 304, 21 N.E, 588 (1889).
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amount of personal estate of a decedent;" 4 and likewise
where it was charged that an executor had failed to discharge
his duties promptly and had by various plausible devices ex-
cused himself from properly accounting for and making final
settlement of his estate.'95 In each of these cases, it was said,
the probate court had full and ample power to grant relief.
No administrator has such an interest in the assets of the
estate he represents as to maintain a bill in equity to deter-
mine what creditor or creditors shall receive the funds he
holds for distribution. 6
Prior to the present Probate Act, which became effective
on January 1, 1940, a petition to sell real estate to pay debts
could be filed in the circuit court or the court of probate in the
county where letters were issued. The present act grants jur-
isdiction to the probate court only, and it seems probable,
therefore, that the circuit court no longer has concurrent jur-
isdiction of the proceedings since they are statutory and not a
part of general equity jurisdiction.'97
Appeals to Circuit Court
Reference has been made to the appellate jurisdiction of
the circuit court both by constitution and statute and for the
purpose of this paper little elaboration is necessary. The gen-
eral jurisdictional power of the circuit court on appeal is
limited and circumscribed to the same jurisdictional subjects
as the probate court. That is, if it is not within the power of
the probate court to hear and determine an issue it is not
within the power of the circuit court to hear and determine
that issue upon appeal from the probate court.'98 An appeal
does not transfer the administration of the estate, or the juris-
diction over the estate, or property to the circuit court. Noth-
ing is transferred except the particular order appealed
from, and when that is disposed of, the order of the circuit
court in relation thereto is transmitted to the probate court,
194 Duval v. Duval, 153 IMI. 49, 38 N.E. 944 (1894).
195 Heustis v. Johnson, 84 Ill. 61 (1876).
196 Shepard v. Speer, 140 II. 238, 29 N.E. 718 (1892).
197 Illinois Probate Act Annotated (Chicago: Foundation Press, 1940), p. 212,
citing Kelly v. Dyer, 359 Ill. 46, 194 N.E. 255 (1935).
198 Howard v. Swift, 356 Ill. 80, 190 N.E. 102 (1934). Motsinger v. Chenoweth,
308 IlL 31, 139 N.E. 27 (1923); Road District v. McKinney, 299 Ill. 130, 132 N.E. 529
(1921).
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which court is again possessed of full and complete jurisdic-
tion over the administration.199
In the circuit court the trial upon appeal is de novo. The
sole duty of the court is to try the case the same as if it had
never been tried before, for which reason it is said that that
court should render final judgment rather than reverse the
judgment, order, or decree of the probate court, or remand
the matter to the latter court.200
An appeal for the removal of a cause from the probate
court to the circuit court for the purpose of obtaining a trial
de novo is a statutory proceeding not peculiar to Illinois, but
not of particularly wide usage. The necessity for it is often
questioned. If a review is desired upon the findings of the pro-
bate court, why should the appeal not be direct to the appel-
late court in all proceedings as well as in those relating to the
sale of real estate which may now be taken direct to the ap-
pellate or supreme court?
The answer lies largely in the development of the system
of probate administration. Trials de novo upon appeal were
unknown to the common law°2 01 but in probate matters may
nonetheless be traced to England. The ecclesiastical courts
had sole jurisdiction to grant probate of wills and letters of
administration and concurrent jurisdiction in the suing for
legacies. All other jurisdiction was in the lay courts and there
was no comity between the two classes of courts. As to real
estate, it will be remembered, the lay courts did not even rec-
ognize the ecclesiastical probate of a will; and every action in
the lay courts involving any matters which might today be
termed probate matters was an initial proceeding. In Illinois
the first courts of probate were inferior in position to the
courts of common pleas, and their powers were largely min-
isterial. Recalling that for a period their judges were styled
"Probate Justices of the Peace" one need consider nothing
further than the common opinion of justices of the peace and
199 Minkler v. Simons, 172 IMi. 323, 50 N.E. 176 (1898); Jones & Cunningham,
Practice, I, 5.
200 Anderson v. Patty, 168 IMI. App. 151 (1912); American Surety Co. of N.Y. v.
Sperry, 171 IMI. App. 56 (1912); In re Petition of Saunders, 245 11. App. 423 (1927).
201 Schooner Constitution v. Woodworth, 2 IMI. (1 Scam.) 510 (1838); In the Mat-
ter of Storey, 120 Ill. 244 (1887): the power to retry is not inherent in the superior
court.
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their legal qualifications to understand why it was desirable
to try anew in the circuit court all causes emanating from the
probate court on appeal.
Yet this method of a new trial in the circuit court is not
entirely an anachronism. Today legal training is not a pre-
requisite for election as a judge, any more than it was in 1818.
The courts of probate throughout the state have uniform
powers, and it is not unexplainable that members of the bar
of many of the smaller counties prefer to have the right to
retry their probate causes before a circuit court rather than
have to appeal direct to the appellate court.
Equitable Jurisdiction of Probate Court
The right of the probate court to exercise equitable juris-
diction in the settlement of estates, when necessary, has been
recognized and sustained in many cases:
"It lies in the nature of these courts that in the exercise of their
jurisdiction they are not confined to legal principles or the rules of com-
mon law courts but exercise equitable powers as well." Whenever, with-
in the scope of their statutory jurisdiction, the relief to be administered,
the right to be enforced or the defence of an action properly depending
before them involves the application of equitable principles, their powers
are commensurate with the duties demanding their exercise, whether
legal or equitable. 202
However, the probate court has no general equitable jur-
isdiction, and, as in all other matters, can exercise equitable
power only within the limits of power conferred by the consti-
tution. 03 Perhaps it is more precise, therefore, to say that in
probate matters and the settlement of estates it has jurisdic-
tion of an equitable character, may adopt the forms of equit-
able proceedings, and grant relief of an equitable nature
where justice and equity require such relief. 20 4
Thus, in proceedings for the allowance of claims, the
202 Woerner, American Law of Administration, I, 506, quoted in Chapman v.
American Surety Co., 261 Ill. 594, 104 N.E. 247 (1914), and Shepard v. Speer, 140 Ill.
238, 29 N.E. 718 (1892), and cited supra, note 117.
203 Howard v. Swift, 356 Ill. 80, 190 N.E. 102 (1934); In re estate of Shanks, 282
Ill. App. 1 (1935); People v. Seelye, 146 Ill. 189, 32 N.E. 458 (1892).
204 Sebree v. Sebree, 293 Ill. 228, 127 N.E. 392 (1920); Walker v. Cook, 294 Ill. 294,
128 N.E. 584 (1920); Spencer v. Boardman, 118 Ill. 553, 9 N.E. 330 (1886); Trego v.
Cunningham, 188 IIl. App. 70 (1914); Hutton v. Porrovecchio, 188 IMI. App. 81 (1914).
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court exercises a kind of equitable jurisdiction, is not limited
to the technical legal rights of the parties, but may act upon
their equities; 05 and the form of such proceedings is similar
to proceedings in chancery.206 And proceedings for accounts
or the adjustments of accounts of executors or administra-
tors are not, under the statute, common law actions, but are
equitable in nature.0 7
It is also held that the probate court has such equitable
jurisdiction that it may, in a proper case, set aside the allow-
ance of a claim and require the parties to proceed de novo;
and such a case would be presented when it appeared that
fraud or mistake had intervened so that a court of equity, if
the facts were before it in a bill to set aside the judgment,
would entertain jurisdiction. 20 8 It may vacate judgments or
any other order fraudulently or collusively procured to be en-
205 Gilbert v. Guptill, 34 Ill. 112 (1864); Hurd, Admr. v. Slaten, 43 Ill. 348 (1867);
McCall v. Lee, 120 Ill. 261 (1887); Shepard v. Speer, 140 Ill. 238, 29 N.E. 708 (1892),
where the court restrained the transfer of a note held against the estate, a power
pertaining exclusively to a court of equity; Matthews v. Kerfoot, 167 Ill. 313, 47
N.E. 859 (1897).
206 Dixon v. Buell, 21 Ill. 202 (1859), wherein it was held'permissible for the
beneficial holder, or assignee, of a contract not assignable at law to file a claim
and proceed in his own name, although courts of law would require such a pro-
ceeding to be in the name of the owner of the legal interest; cited frequently in
subsequent decisions.
207 Chapman v. Amer. Surety Co., 261 ll. 594, 104 N.E. 247 (1914); Wadsworth
v. Connell, 104 Ill. 369 (1882), wherein it was held that court of probate had full
power to apply equitable relief and hold executor liable for loss on money loaned
by him without authority of will or statute; Millard v. Harris, 119 Ill. 185, 10 N.E.
387 (1887): "In case of mistake or accident, by which the administrator or execu-
tor is charged in his report with too much or too little, the court will be author-
ized to ascertain the true facts, and correct the report as the facts may justify
and warrant, and charge the executor or administrator with the amount he justly
owes," and the court "has equitable jurisdiction, and may adopt equitable forms
of procedure." In The Matter of Corrington, 124 InI. 363, 16 N.E. 252 (1888): where
land had been devised to be sold by the executor, the proceeds thereof divided
among testator's .children, and the children had objected to the executor's account
on basis land was sold for less than its value and less than executor might reason-
ably have received; held, in equity this devise, by doctrine of equitable conver-
sion, was a fund in executor's hands.
208 Schlink v. Maxton, 48 Ill. App. 471 (1892), affirmed 153 Ill. 447, 38 N.E. 1063
(1894): "There seems to be great propriety, and even necessity, in permitting
that court (of probate) to open an allowance whenever it finds that fraud or mis-
take has occurred. There is nothing to prevent a proper exercise of equity jur-
isdiction upon a motion. The court may hear evidence and sift the matter with as
much care and accuracy as though the proceedings were in chancery, and the
rights of parties may be adjusted more speedily than would be possible if resort
were had to that tribunal."
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tered, even though the term of court at which a judgment or
order was entered, or a claim allowed, has passed. 09
But inasmuch as the probate court does not have a gen-
eral chancery jurisdiction it can have no supervision and con-
trol over trust matters;210 it cannot judicially pass upon the
question of liability of a trust estate nor determine solicitor's
fees and expenses in litigation thereof; 21 1 it cannot take jur-
isdiction of a contest between an administrator and a third
person alleged to have received property in trust for an in-
testate during lifetime in which the administrator asks an ac-
counting;212 and for the same reason, when executors and
trustees under a will are the same persons, the probate court
loses jurisdiction of the property upon the final settlement of
the estate even though the executors fail to procure their for-
mal discharge as such.21 '
GENERAL CLASSIFICATION OF GRANTS OF POWER
TO PROBATE COURTS OF ILLINOIS
(ILLUSTRATED FROM THE PROBATE ACT)
Some five or six years ago the section on probate and
trust law of the Illinois State Bar Association initiated a
movement for the codification of the laws of the state relating
to the estates of minors, incompetents, and decedents, which
culminated in the enactment of the Probate Act of 1939 to be-
come effective on January 1, 1940. The act represents a com-
prehensive revision and consolidation of former statutes
dealing with the substantive and procedural aspects of pro-
bate law. The most important of the former statutes relating
to the estates of decedents which were merged in the Probate
Act are the Administration Act, Descent Act, Dower Act, and
Wills Act.
209 Hicks v. Monahan, 209 Il1. App. 516 (1918); In re German's Estate, 144 Ill.
App. 109, affirmed Whittemore v. Coleman, 239 Il1. 450, 88 N.E. 228 (1908);
Schlink v. Maxton. 153 IIl. 447, 38 N.E. 1063 (1894).
210 Estate of Mortenson, 248 Ill. 520, 94 N.E. 120 (1911); Frackelton v. Masters,
249 Ill. 30, 94 N.E. 124 (1911).
211 Montgomery, Hart and Smith v. Dime Savings & Trust Co., 214 Ill. App. 553,
affirmed 290 Ill. 407, 125 N.E. 309 (1919).
212 In re Chalifoux's Estate, 230 Ill. App. 199 (1923), reversed in Runyan v.
Williams, 315 Ill. 628, 146 N.E. 497 (1925) on other grounds.
213 In re Robinson's Estate, 214 fI. App. 262 (1919).
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The committee of the bar association which prepared the
act for presentation to the legislature consisted of lawyers
from different sections of the state, who were well versed in
probate law and procedure, and their various drafts were
submitted for comment to bench and bar throughout the
state. Constitutional limitations upon the jurisdiction and
powers of probate courts were constantly before the drafts-
men in the form of Illinois case law, and the act itself bears
testimony that they labored conscientiously as well as intelli-
gently. But, of course, neither their good conscience nor their
intelligence can support an assumption that every power con-
ferred by the act upon probate courts is within the frame-
work of the constitutional provisions relating to such courts.
That, only time and the supreme court will determine.
In the meanwhile, by way of illustration, observation
may be made of certain powers so conferred upon probate
courts which tend to broaden in more or less degree their
jurisdiction or about which there have been questions rela-
tive to the courts' constitutional jurisdiction. Some of these
appear minor, but they assume importance when it is re-
membered that a showing of a want of power in the court to do
even a minor thing may subject to successful collateral at-
tack an order, judgment, or decree dealing with major
affairs.
These grants of jurisdiction,214 in the same manner as all
previous grants, are subject to classification in a general way
as follows:
1. Jurisdiction to hear and determine matters incident to
the settlement of an estate, the administration of which is
currently pending in that court, which matters may be fur-
ther subdivided into
a. those strictly and unequivocally incident to the set-
tlement, and
b. those only collaterally incident to the settlement;
2. Jurisdiction to hear and determine matters incident to
214 The grants discussed are not necessarily new or additional powers; indeed,
some of them may more properly be termed new methods of the exercise of juris-
diction previously recognized. Others, of long, but perhaps questionable standing,
are discussed because of their general interest.
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the settlement of an estate, the administration of which is not
pending in that court.
There is ample logic and reason-indeed, necessity-
that the probate court have full jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine all matters strictly and unequivocally incident to the
settlement of an estate pending before it, which, with the
trend of recent decisions, may reasonably support a conclu-
sion that any power conferred upon the court within that
phase of the classification is constitutionally valid. However,
as one progresses downward in the classification, the logic,
necessity, and precedents diminish, so that there may be
some question of the constitutionality of powers relating to
matters in estates the administration of which is not pending
in the particular probate court. This was recognized by the
framers of the Probate Act in the provisions relating to cer-
tain matters that proceedings might be brought in the circuit
as well as in the probate court.
For purposes of the discussion, the illustrations will be
grouped in the form of the classification.1 5
Jurisdiction to Determine Matters Strictly Incident
to Settlement of Estate the Administration of
Which Is Pending in Probate Court
Extension of Time: for Renunciation of Will;
for Perfection of Dower
The act provides that the surviving spouse of a testator,
in order to renounce the will, shall file an instrument in the
215 To treat the possibilities exhaustively is clearly not within the province of
this thesis. However, attention may be drawn to other powers granted by the act
which would serve as well for purposes of illustration, as follows:
Administration of personal estate: the power to authorize representative to
mortgage personal estate, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 363; to direct representative
to "exchange any claim or any interest in personal estate for other claims or per-
sonal estate," ibid., 368.
Administration of real estate: the power to authorize executor to whom real
estate has been devised as executor to lease, ibid., § 374; to order the completion
of the purchase of real estate being purchased under contract (if no claim has
been filed by vendor), ibid., § 404; to authorize representative to complete a de-
cedent's contract to convey real estate, ibid., § 406.
Nonresident executors or administrators: the power to authorize sale of per-
sonal estate for purposes under act for which a resident representative may sell,
or for such other purposes as the domiciliary court may direct.
Wills: the power to determine whether it was intention of testator to disinherit
a child of testator born after execution of will, ibid., 199.
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probate court in which the will was admitted to probate, de-
claring the renunciation. The instrument shall be filed within
ten months after admission of the will to probate, or
within such further time as may be allowed by the probate court if,
within ten months after the admission of the will to probate or before
the expiration of any extended period, the surviving spouse files a ver-
ified petition therefor setting forth that litigation is pending that affects
the share of the surviving spouse in the estate.2 16
There is a similar provision for the extension of time
within which a surviving spouse may perfect dower. 217
These provisions are new to Illinois law.21 8 Their pur-
poses are obvious: to enable the surviving spouse to elect the
most advantageous course to him or her after the litigation
has been determined. The discretion of the court under the
sanctions of these provisions is qualified in that a petition
must be filed setting forth the pendency of litigation affecting
the share of the surviving spouse in the estate, and in neither
situation is it possible for the court to act unless the adminis-
tration of the estate is pending before it.
The court's power to extend the time within which instru-
ments must be filed in these situations would seem to be cer-
tain by reason of its equitable jurisdiction over the questions.
It has been held that the court has equitable powers concern-
ing questions arising out of a renunciation and also over the
election of a surviving spouse as between the taking of a dow-
er or a fee interest in the real estate. 21 ' The basis of the deci-
sions is that the questions involve the equitable doctrine of
election; the surviving spouse must choose whether to take
his or her statutory share of the estate or the devise under the
will.
The Assignment of Dower
By Section 30 of the act, the proceedings for the assign-
ment of dower are required to be commenced "in a court of
216 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 169.
217 Ibid., 171. Instrument is to be filed with Recorder of Deeds or Registrar of
Titles of the county in which the real estate lies. Petition for extension must be
filed within ten months after issuance of letters or after admission of will to pro-
bate or before expiration of any extended period.
218 Illinois Probate Act Annotated (Chicago: The Foundation Press, 1940), p. 27.
This annotation was published under the direction of the Illinois State Bar Asso-
ciation.
219 Davis v. Mather, 309 Il. 284, 141 N.E. 209 (1923); Kerner v. Peterson, 368
Ill. 59, 12 N.E. (2d) 884 (1938).
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record of competent jurisdiction" and the mode of trail shall
be "as in cases in equity. '220 The probate court is not a
proper court in which to institute the proceedings, but the cir-
cuit court has jurisdiction. As stated in People v. Graw:
By the constitution circuit courts have jurisdiction of all causes in
law and equity. The term . . . includes every claim or demand in a
court of justice which was known at the adoption of the constitution as
an action at law or a suit in chancery, and also all actions since pro-
vided for which involve personal or property rights of the same nature
as those previously enforced by actions at law or in equity.2 21
As has been pointed out by annotators of the Probate Act ,222
not only was there a common law action of dower, but by the
former Dower Act the right of dower was enforced by a peti-
tion in chancery.
However, Section 37 provides:
In any proceeding involving the title to real estate in which a person
claims an unassigned dower interest and on the petition of any person
interested in the real estate, the court shall decree the assignment of
dower in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
And in the sale or mortgage of a decedent's real estate
for the purpose of paying debts, legacies, or administration
expenses it is provided by Section 234 that the probate court
may, in the proceeding, "decree the assignment of dower" in
accordance with the provisions in the act. Only as an incident
to the sale or mortgage of real estate for the purposes stated
does it appear that the probate court has jurisdiction for the
assignment. In such cases there seems to be no question, be-
cause of the precedent that, incident to such sales, the court
has broad powers to adjust equities and determine questions
of conflicting titles. 223
The Determination of Questions of Title, Claims of Adverse
Title, and the Right of Property Upon Citation to Recover
Property and Discover Information 2 4
Under Article XV of the act, if the executor or adminis-
trator or any person interested in the estate believes that
220 IMl. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 181.
221 363 1M1. 205, 2 N.E. (2d) 71 (1936).
222 Illinois Probate Act Annotated, p. 43.
223 Newell v. Montgomery, 129 IMI. 58, 21 N.E. 508 (1889). Decision discussed at
length, supra, note 127.
224 The sections dealt with here confer upon the court no powers newly created
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someone is concealing, converting, embezzling, or has in his
possession or control any personal property, books of ac-
count, papers, evidences of debt, or title to lands, which be-
longed to a person whose estate is being administered, or
which belongs to his estate or his executor or administrator,
or believes that someone is withholding information or knowl-
edge which is needed for the recovery of any property by suit
or otherwise, he may file a verified petition and the probate
court shall order a citation to issue for the appearance before
it of the person named in the petition.22 5 The proceeding is
similar to discovery in chancery.
At the hearing the court may examine the respondent,
hear the evidence offered by any party and ". . . may deter-
mine all questions of title, claims of adverse title, and the
right of property, and may enter such orders and judgment
as the case requires. ' ' 226
The respondent may be committed to jail if he refuses to
answer proper questions or obey the orders or judgment of the
court, or the court may enforce its order of judgment by ex-
ecution against the property of the respondent.2 27
Upon the demand of any party to the proceeding, ques-
tions of title, claims of adverse title, and the right of property
shall be determined by a jury.228
Illinois' first statute of wills enacted in 1829 provided that
if an executor or administrator or other person interested in
an estate should state on oath, to the court of probate, that he
believed any person had in his possession, or had concealed
or embezzled any goods, chattels, moneys, books of account,
papers, or any evidences of debt, etc., the court should re-
quire such person to appear on a citation and might examine
him on oath; and if such person should refuse to answer
proper interrogatories, or should refuse to deliver up such
property when required by order of the court, the court
by the Probate Act with reference to the estates of decedents, but the sections do
contain substantive changes pertaining to estates of minors and incompetents,
making proceedings and powers in the latter cases the same as in the former.
Justification for discussion of the subject lies in its relative newness to Illinois law
in the present complete and now apparently valid form, its practical importance,
and the general interest therein, particularly of persons constantly engaged in the
administration of estates.
225 IlL Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 335. 226 Ibid., § 337.
227 Ibid. 228 IMi. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 338.
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might commit such person to jail until he should comply with
the order. 29 The same provisions were carried into the stat-
ute of wills of 1845.20
The purpose of the enactment was to enable proper
parties to discover assets of an estate, and it was designed to
afford a more speedy and less expensive mode than by det-
inue, trover, or replevin. The remedy was cumulative to
those and the only change it intended to introduce from an
ordinary trial involving ownership of property was to en-
able the court to compel the person charged with having
the property, to discover, on oath, whether he had property
in his possession.23 ' It was held such statute was not designed
to afford the means of collecting debts due to estates, but
was applicable only to obtaining possession of money, books,
papers, or property which remained in specie and was cap-
able of being identified and pointed out.1 2
The Administration Act adopted in 1872, as amended in
1873, also contained substantially the same provisions, ex-
cept that the remedy was broadened to apply not only to
property and effects, but also, if they had been converted, to
the proceeds or value thereof.28
From 1873 to 1925 the Administration Act thus provided a
summary method for the recovery of property of the char-
acter defined which belonged to a decedent at the time of his
death, but had come into the possession of a third party prior
thereto, and which that party either retained in his possession
or had concealed or embezzled. Where the decedent's owner-
ship of the property in his lifetime was not disputed, the
court might order the respondent, by authority of these pro-
visions, to deliver the property, or if he had converted it, the
proceeds or value thereof, to the executor or administrator.
But since the act provided for no jury trial, the proceed-
ing was not properly to be invoked if the respondent claimed
to be the owner of the property sought to be recovered or
if the obligation was a debt. To determine the ownership or
229 Rev. Laws, 1833, p. 641, § 86; Jones Ill. Stats. Ann., 1 110.432.
230 Rev. Stats., 1845, Ch. 109, p. 556, 1 90.
231 Wade v. Pritchard, 69 IMI. 278 (1873).
282 Williams v. Conley, 20 II. 643 (1858).
23 Laws 1871-2, p. 77, If 81 and 82; as amended by Laws of 1873, p. 1,
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
obtain satisfaction of the debt, the executor or administra-
tor was compelled to resort to a court of competent jurisdic-
tion wherein the defendant could have a trial by jury as
guaranteed by the constitution.234
In 1925 the act was amended. 23 The amendment, among
other things, provided specifically that the respondent's con-
trol of property as distinguished from possession merely, and
his conversion as well as concealment and embezzlement,
might be made the subject of inquiry; it enlarged the pro-
vision to include property belonging "to the executor or ad-
ministrator or the estate of any deceased person" as well as
to the decedent; and conferred upon the court the power to
determine, upon a trial by jury if demanded by either party,
questions of title and rights of property.
Thus has this proceeding, and the power of the probate
court with reference thereto, been developed. The Probate
Act reflects the development, and since the provisions are
the same there seems no doubt of the constitutionality of this
grant of power to the probate court inasmuch as the con-
stitutionality of the provisions, as amended in 1925, has been
upheld.3 6
Summarizing, it may be said that Article XV of the Pro-
bate Act provides a proper summary method-apart from the
recovery of books of account, papers, evidences of debt, or
title, and the obtaining of information-to recover possession
of specific property, or if converted, its proceeds or value.
It contemplates that the decedent, at the time of his death,
held or at least claimed, and that the executor or administra-
tor, since his death, either in succession or initially, holds
or claims the title to the property of which possession is
sought. It does not include jurisdiction of an action for the
recovery of money the title to which is in the debtor, because
in such case the debtor owns the money, is indebted for it,
and consequently has no money belonging to the decedent,
the estate, or executor or administrator, in his possession. 23 7
234 Johnson v. Nelson, 341 IlM. 119, 173 N.E. 77 (1930), citing Dinsmoor v. Bress-
ler, 164 Ill. 211, 45 N.E. 1086 (1896); Martin v. Martin, 170 Ill. 18, 48 N.E. 164 (1897);
Sullivan v. Arcola State Bank, 314 Ill. 40, 145 N.E. 167 (1924).
235 Laws 1925, pp. 1, 2.
236 Hansen v. Swartz, 345 Ill. 609, 178 N.E. 246 (1931).
237 These are substantially the words of Mr. Justice DeYoung in Johnson v. Nel-
son, 341 Ill. 119, 173 N.E. 77 (1930).
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The executor or administrator may be the respondent, as
one of the purposes of the provisions is to confer upon the
court the power to compel him to inventory and account for
assets.23  The fact that the executor or administrator claims
the property in question in his individual capacity is immate-
rial.23
The Sale or Mortgage of Real Estate to Pay
Administration Expenses
Section 225240 of the act provides:
When there is insufficient personal estate to pay expenses of admin-
istration, claims against the estate, or legacies expressly or impliedly
charged by the decedent's will upon his real estate, the executor or ad-
ministrator by leave of the Probate Court and upon such terms as the
court directs, may sell or mortage for those purposes real estate or
interest therein to which the decedent had claim or title.
No former statutes of Illinois have contained authoriza-
tion for an administrator to mortgage real estate, and it
was held that he lacked the authority,2 '1 but an executor
could do so under certain limitations and upon proper order
of the county court.242 Inasmuch as an executor or admini-
strator, in mortgaging real estate, cannot bind the heir or
devisee personally, without consent of the heir or devisee, and
further, since the mortgaging of real estate is the convey-
ance of a lesser interest therein than the sale of such real
estate, for purposes of this discussion it will be assumed that
if support may be found for the jurisdiction of the probate
court to sell real estate to pay administration expenses in an
estate pending before it, the court will have the same juris-
diction to mortgage real estate for the purpose. 24
238 In re Estate of Baker, 202 Ill. App. 463 (1916).
239 Day v. Bullen, 226 Ill. 72, 80 N.E. 739 (1907); In re Estate of Bennett, 248 Ill.
App. 174 (1928); Northern Trust Co. v. Archbald, 303 Ill. App. 486, 25 N.E. (2d) 593
(1940).
240 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 379.
241 Smith v. Hutchinson, 108 Ill. 662 (1884).
242 The former statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 120) giving power to ex-
ecutors to mortgage real estate by leave of county court was enacted in 1869, Laws
1869, p. 372. Since this was prior to the creation of probate courts by constitution
and statute, probate courts have had no jurisdiction over the proceeding.
243 Upon this logic the court would have jurisdiction over the mortgaging of real
estate for the payment of debts and legacies since it unquestionably has jurisdic-
tion over the sale of real estate for such purposes.
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Section 98 of the former Administration Act had a rather
obscure provision that, if the personal estate of a decedent
was insufficient to pay the claims against his estate, real
estate might be sold "to satisfy the indebtedness of such de-
cedent, and the expenses of administration." From the word-
ing the inference would seem to be that, provided the real
estate had to be sold to pay debts primarily, funds for the
payment of administration expenses might be obtained from
the same sale. However, there are only two supreme court
decisions on the question of sale to pay administration ex-
penses, and in both it was held improper.244
The case of Fitzgerald v. Glancy 245 came before the court
on a state of facts in which all of the equities were against
the permission of the sale. The estate had no personalty and
no debts. The administrator incurred and paid needless ex-
pense seemingly for the sole purpose of establishing a prem-
ise for the sale of the real estate. The court held that real
estate can be sold only to liquidate debts which were due and
owing at the time of the death of the decedent.
In Massachusetts it has been held that there is no right
of sale to pay administration expenses where the statute pro-
vides only for sales to pay debts.246 And in construing an
Ohio statute providing that in case of insufficiency of person-
al assets "to pay all debts of the deceased ... and charges of
administration of the estate" application should be made "to
the probate court or the court of common pleas for authority
to sell the real estate of the deceased," it was held that the
land could not be sold for the sole purpose of paying adminis-
tration expenses where there were no debts of the decedent
to be paid.24 7
The premise of the Illinois court that debts must be due
or owing at the time of the death of the decedent in order to
form the basis for a sale of real estate has an exception.
244 Fitzgerald v. Glancy, 49 Ill. 465 (1869); Walker v. Diehl, 79 Il. 473 (1875).
The former case was decided prior to enactment (1871) of provision referred to,
but the latter case was subsequent.
245 49 Il. 465 (1869).
240 Dean v. Dean, 3 Mass. 258 (1807). To the same effect was Drinkwater v.
Drinkwater, 4 Mass. 353 (1808), but held: lands received in foreclosure of a mort-
gage, or taken in execution to satisfy a judgment are considered as personal as-
sets and liable to administration expenses.
241 Carr v. Hull, 65 Ohio St. 394, 62 N.E. 439 (1901).
JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURTS OF ILLINOIS
When the personalty is insufficient to pay the widow's award,
sales of real estate are permitted for that purpose. The court
has not attempted to say the award is a debt due and owing
at the time of the husband's death, but has based its con-
clusions on two reasons: first, that the rights of widows are
favorites of the law; and second, that the award is a pre-
ferred claim. 248 By analogy it could be argued that sales of
real estate should be permitted for the payment of adminis-
tration expenses because they also constitute a perferred
claim under the statute.
Favoring the validity of sales for the purpose of paying
administration expenses and, therewith, the authority of the
probate court to order such sales is: first, the now specific
statute providing the requisite authority; second, the provi-
sion of the Probate Act that the act shall be liberally con-
strued and that "the rule that statutes in derogation of the
common law shall be strictly construed does not apply";2 49
third, the desirability and necessity of a public policy encour-
aging executors and administrators to proceed diligently in
the collection of assets without the fear that expenses thus
incurred will have to be borne by themselves, individually;
fourth, the fact that under the statutory classification of
claims administration expenses are prior to the widow's
award, and the payment of the latter will support sales;
fifth, the payment of administration expenses is as much
an indispensable incident to the administration of an estate
as is the payment of legacies, which has been held to be a
valid reason for sales of real estate where by the will the
legacies were made a charge upon the real estate.
In Fitzgerald v. Glancy 250 the court seemed to fear that,
if the proceeding were allowed, it would subject the real es-
tate of intestates dying free from debt "to the cupidity of un-
conscientious administrators, whose designs might be to ap-
propriate it to themselves, to the injury of the heirs at law."
The statutes, it would seem, furnish other sufficient remedies
248 Cruce v. Cruce, 21 III. 46 (1858); Deltzer v. Scheuster, 37 IlM. 302 (1865);
Denk v. Fiel, 249 Ill. 424, 94 N.E. 672 (1911).
249 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 159. The proceeding for leave to sell real
estate was unknown to common law for which reason, heretofore, strict compli-
ance with the statutory provisions permitting it has been held necessary.
250 40 Ill. 465 (1869).
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to control such administrators without necessitating the com-
plete disallowance, no matter what the circumstances, of the
court's authority to permit honest administrators to sell real
estate to pay expenses of administration validly incurred and
necessary to "the settlement of estates of deceased persons."
The Power to Construe a Will
Section 29151 of the act provides:
The probate court may enforce the settlement of estates. On every
settlement . . . when it appears that there are sufficient assets to pay
all claims . . . the court may order the executor or administrator to dis-
tribute the estate to the persons entitled thereto.
By implication this section clearly confers upon the pro-
bate court the right to construe a will whenever such con-
struction is involved in the settlement and distribution of the
estate of a testator.2 52 As Woerner has said, writing gener-
ally:
It is obvious that distribution cannot be made nor legacies ordered
to be paid, unless the rights of legatees are first adjudicated; and
such adjudication involves the ascertainment of the testator's intention,
in order to fix the rights of legatees in accordance therewith, and
whether a bequest is void, or adeemed. It is the decree of distribution
that determines the rights of legatees and distributees; hence such
order or decree is conclusive as to the rights of heirs, legatees and
devisees, subject only to be set aside or modified on appeal.
However, the power is limited to determining to whom the
executor must pay or deliver the funds in the first instance,
and does not extend to the determination of questions between
legatees themselves, such as whether the legacy is absolute
or for life only, or subject to trusts or conditions." 3
251 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 445.
252 It will be remembered that at common law the ecclesiastical courts could
neither take the accounts necessary sometimes to ascertain the amount of lega-
cies, nor enforce their decrees; construction of a will was primarily a function
of equity and, at the most, the ecclesiastical courts did not ever have more than
a concurrent jurisdiction in the "suing for legacies." It seems clear the power
to construe does not reside in probate courts unless expressly or by necessary
implication conferred, and some decisions hold the jurisdiction of equity will be
exercised unless taken away by a statute in plain and unmistakable terms;
Woerner, op. cit., I, 530, and note 6.
253 Woerner, op. cit., I, 527. In Minkler v. Simons, 172 Ill. 323, 50 N.E. 176 (1898),
controversy was in regard to construction of will and distribution of trust funds in
hands of administrator with will annexed; held: anyone interested in the trust
property had the right to invoke aid of a court of equity to obtain construction and
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It has been held that Section 116 of the former Adminis-
tration Act, authorizing county courts to enforce the settle-
ment of estates and to order and direct the payment of
legacies, gave to probate courts the power to determine the
legal right of a legatee.254 The court approved the statement
of Professor Page 25 that where a statute gives probate
courts authority to direct the payment of legacies such courts
may construe wills insofar as is necessary to direct the pay-
ment of legacies.
This holding would seem to apply with equal force to the
authority of the court as provided by the new act, but the
precedents limit the application to determination of legal
rights only.
Jurisdiction to Determine Matters Collaterally Incident
to Settlement of Estate the Administration
of Which Is Pending in Probate Court
Partnership Estates: Power to Deal with Surviving
Partner and Partnership Estate
Article XVI of the act provides that after the death of a
partner the surviving partner shall file an inventory of the
assets of the partnership in the probate court in which letters
testamentary or of administration are issued on the estate of
the decedent; or if no letters are issued in this state, in
the probate court of the county of which the decedent was
a resident at the time of his death or, if a nonresident, in
the probate court of the county in which the partnership car-
ried on its business.2 56
The article further provides that the court may order
the surviving partner to account to it, 257 and, if it appears
that it is for the best interest of the estate of the decedent,
the court may order him to give security for the faithful
enforce the trust, but when the will was construed and the rights of the parties
determined, the settlement of the estate could proceed in the county court.
254 Strawn v. Trustees of Jacksonville Female Academy, 240 Inl. 111, 88 N.E.
460 (1909), wherein the jurisdiction of the circuit court was denied because the
circumstances were ordinary; Kerner v. Peterson, 368 Il1. 59, 12 N.E. (2d) 884
(1938).
255 William Herbert Page, Laws of Wills (Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson & Co.,
1901), §807, p. 963.
256 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 340.
257 Ibid., § 341.
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settlement of the partnership affairs and the payment of any
amount due the decedent's estate. 258 If the surviving partner
neglects or refuses to file an inventory, a list of liabilities,
or an appraisal, or fails to account to the court or to file
a bond, after he has been directed to do so, the court may
commit him to jail; and where the surviving partner fails
to file a bond after being ordered to do so, the court may
also appoint a receiver of the partnership estate with like
powers and duties of receivers in chancery.2 9
These provisions originated with the laws of 1869,260 were
altered only slightly with the enactment of the Administration
Act in 1872, and are continued in substance in the present law.
It is held that surviving partners, on the dissolution of
the firm by the death of one of the members, are charged
with the duty of proceeding at once to settle the partnership
estate. They become trustees as to the deceased partner's
interest, and while there is a community of interest between
them and the representatives of the deceased partner in the
adjustment of the partnership affairs, the partnership, for
that purpose, only has a limited continuance. If the survi-
vors do not account in a reasonable time, a court of chan-
cery will grant an injunction to restrain them from acting,
appoint a receiver, and direct an account to be taken.26'
Precedents established under the former statutes seem
equally applicable to the present act. If they are applied,
the act is to be considered merely as confirmatory of the
rights of the personal representatives as such rights were
previously recognized by equity and it does not provide new
remedies with reference to settling partnership estates; 262
the jurisdiction conferred upon the court of probate by the
act is not to be regarded as exclusive of the ordinary juris-
diction of a court of equity;263 but a court of equity will
258 Ibid., § 342.
259 Ibid., § 343.
260 Laws 1869, pp. 1, 2, 3.
261 Nelson v. Hayner, 66 Il1. 487 (1873); Andrews v. Stinson, 254 Ill. 111, 98 N.E.
222 (1912).
262 Nelson v. Hayner, 66 Ia. 487 (1873).
263 Breckenridge v. Ostrom, 79 Ill. 71 (1875); Andrews v. Stinson, 254 InI. 111,
98 N.E. 222 (1912). Substance and mode of procedure authorized constitute special
statutory proceeding when considered as a whole, but is equitable in nature. Pick
v. Diecks, 218 Ill. App. 295 (1920).
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only interfere in the settlement when there is some equitable
ground for interference.264
The settlement of a partnership estate is in the nature
of a collateral incident to the administration of an estate,
rather than a strict incident, and the cases cited leave no
doubt as to the authority of the probate court when the
administration of the estate is pending before it. In the cases
cited, such were the facts.
However, under circumstances wherein no administra-
tion is pending in this state, the act nevertheless purports to
confer the same authority on the probate court. If the de-
cedent was a resident, the power is given to the court of
the county in which he resided or, if he was a nonresident,
to the probate court of the county in which the partnership
carried on its business. Under such circumstances the pro-
bate court's authority would seem to be questionable, and
a court of equity would appear to be the better court in which
to bring proceedings. The classification within which such
circumstances fall is next to be discussed.
Jurisdiction to Determine Matters Incident to
Settlement of Estate the Administration of
Which Is Not Pending in Probate Court
Estates of Nonresident Decedents: Power to Authorize
Nonresident Executor or Administrator to
Sell or Mortgage Real Estate
By Section 271265 a nonresident executor or administra-
tor,266 when no letters have been granted in Illinois on the
estate of his decedent, may file his petition in the circuit or
probate court of the county in which the real estate of his
decedent, or the greater part therof, may lie
• . . for the sale or mortgage267 of the real estate or interest therein
for any of the purposes for which a resident executor or administrator
may sell or mortgage under this Act, or for such other purposes as the
264 Wharf v. Wharf, 306 Ill. 79. 137 N.E. 446 (1922).
265 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 425.
266 To qualify as executor of the will or administrator of the estate in an Illi-
nois administration a person must be a resident of Illinois; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939.
Ch. 3, §§ 229, 246.
267 For the sake of brevity in the discussion only sales will be referred to.
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court which issued letters to such person may direct. The circuit or
probate court of this state is authorized to grant the prayer of the
petition.
This section places resident and nonresident represent-
atives on different planes in respect to the purposes for
which sales of real estate may be authorized by the probate
court. The court may authorize the former to sell only for
the purposes of paying debts and legacies, when they are a
charge upon the real estate, and administration expenses;
but may authorize the latter to sell not only for those pur-
poses but also for such other purposes as the foreign court
which issued letters testamentary or of administration may
direct. However, a mere lack of uniformity in the purposes
which will support a sale as between resident or nonresident
representatives would not appear to be a serious fault so
long as the respective purposes stand on an equal footing of
constitutional validity.
That, of course, raises the question of whether the pro-
bate court has the constitutional jurisdiction to authorize
sales for the respective purposes, and this, with complete
assurance, may be answered affirmatively only as to sales
to pay debts or to pay legacies. Jurisdiction of the court over
sales for the purpose of paying administration expenses, in
view of the lack of either specific constitutional authority
or modern judicial consideration, must remain questionable.
Jurisdiction of the court over sales for "such other pur-
poses" as a foreign court may direct seems to be a rank
delegation of legislative power to another entity-and one
out-of-state at that-as well as a most questionable extension
of the jurisdiction of the court when viewed in the light of
the decisions. Moreover, it is obvious that under these cir-
cumstances the power of the court to authorize a sale for
"such other purposes" must be within the limits of its
constitutional jurisdiction, for, certainly, no mere direction
of a foreign court can add one ounce to the power of the
probate court as given to it by the Constitution.
However, assuming for the moment that the respective
purposes for which a sale may be authorized are all of con-
stitutional validity, the problem then becomes focused in
this single question: When no administration is pending in
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Illinois, can the sale of real estate owned by a nonresident
decedent be a proper subject of jurisdiction of the probate
court?
In Estate of Mortenson 261 it was stated that a probate
court has no jurisdiction over real estate, 26 9 but that what it
has is certain powers in regard to real estate. This distinction
is pertinent to the question, and of particular force in that the
context of the Supreme Court's statement would seem to
limit the real estate in regard to which the probate court
could exercise its powers to that owned by a decedent whose
estate was in administration before the court.
In Winch v. Tobin2T0 it was held the court had jurisdic-
tion to order the sale of a minor's real estate because such
sale was "a kindred matter to the appointment of guardians
and the settlement of their accounts." This conclusion, it was
said in the Mortenson opinion, was reached only by giving a
very liberal construction to the constitution, and perhaps
could not have been justified solely on the ground that an
application by a guardian to sell the real estate of his minor
was a probate matter.
In another case the probate court was said to be the
ultimate legal adviser and director of a conservator, which
reason was assigned in aid of the conclusion that the court
could hear and determine claims against incompetents as a
feature of its jurisdiction in the appointment of conservators
and settlement of their accounts. 271 For the court to main-
tain a relationship such as "ultimate legal adviser and direc-
tor" is clearly impossible when the fiduciary is the appointee
of a foreign court.
The sale of real estate on the petition of a nonresident
representative is without doubt a probate matter, but it is
the probate matter of the domiciliary or other court that has
probate jurisdiction of the estate. In the proceedings, the
factor of jurisdiction for the purpose of administration is
lacking. That lack was sufficient reason for the denial of
268 248 Ill. 520, 94 N.E. 120 (1911).
269 Citing Ferguson v. Hunter, 2 Gilm. 657 (1845).
270 107 11. 212 (1883).
271 First State Bank of Steger v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 302 IMI. 77, 134
N.E. 46 (1922).
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the court's jurisdiction over testamentary trusts2 72 and it
would seem to be a sufficient reason for the denial of juris-
diction in this situation. The factor of a pending administra-
tion before the court is one without which jurisdiction of the
court need be recognized in no conceivable situation as a ne-
cessity to the accomplishment of the true purposes for
which the probate court was created.
The court may, of course, gain jurisdiction through an-
cillary administration proceedings, but the administration
then becomes domestic and the question vanishes. When a
nonresident executor or administrator wishes to avoid an
Illinois administration, yet sell or mortgage real property
of the estate in Illinois, he will be better advised to bring his
proceedings in the circuit court.
CONCLUSION
The words of the present Constitution of Illinois, insofar
as they are determinative of the jurisdiction and powers of
the probate courts relative to the estates of decedents, are
that the courts, when established, "shall have original juris-
diction of all probate matters . . . the settlement of estates
• . . and . . . of the sales of real estate of deceased persons
for the payment of debts." If there is a fundamental defect
in these provisions, it is that they are specific when they
should be general, for, in the creation of a judicial system, it
more befits the organic law to establish only the framework,
leaving to the statute law the details of the structure. With
reference to the probate courts it may be said, with some
justification, that the framers of the Constitution invaded
the rightful province of the legislature.
The function of probate courts is to supervise and con-
trol the administration of estates, but the immediate purpose
which prompted their creation was the relief of county courts,
in the counties of larger population, from the overburdening
probate business naturally resulting from great numbers of
people. Time has proved the wisdom of this division of labor.
However, the phraseology of the framers of the Constitution
has produced a paradox in that the legislature may grant
272 Estate of Mortenson, 248 1l. 520, 94 N.E. 120 (1911).
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such jurisdiction as it sees fit to the courts of probate in the
counties of smaller population, "because they are county
courts; whereas to the courts of probate in the counties hav-
ing the greater volume of probate business and a consequent
greater need for courts with clear and ample powers, the
legislature may grant only a limited jurisdiction, because
they are probate courts.
The restrictive nature of the constitutional phraseology
also produced a train of doubts-doubts as to the scope and
nature of the jurisdiction which probate courts might exer-
cise, doubts as to their powers even within their acknowl-
edged field of jurisdiction, doubts as to the force and effect
of their orders, judgments, and decrees. How numerically
great have been these doubts in the minds of members of the
bar, and how prompt lawyers have been to raise them when
a cause could thereby be served, is witnessed by the mass of
cases which have come before the higher courts. And the
end is not yet, for judicial construction is still necessary to
clarify some uncertainties that remain.
There have been factors other than the constitutional
phraseology which have tended to prevent greater acknowl-
edgment of the courts' jurisdiction. One was the long con-
tinued acceptance of the English conception of probate juris-
diction. The strength of this traditional viewpoint was great-
est in the earlier days of Illinois, diminished naturally as
time widened the perspective and other American states
broke from its embrace, and seems to have waned almost
completely by the year 1909, else the attempt, though un-
successful, would not then have been made to give probate
courts jurisdiction in the supervision and control of testa-
mentary trusts.
Another factor has been the apparent desire of some
members of the bar that courts of probate be held as closely
as possible to be ministerial rather than judicial agencies.
This attitude of the profession may be traced to a distrust
of the legal qualifications of some of the judges, and its re-
sult is apprehended most readily in the statutory provision
for appeals to the circuit court with trials de novo, rather
than appeals direct to the appellate court, in matters other
than proceedings for the sale of real estate. By reason of
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this form of procedure these attorneys may have their issues
retried before circuit judges, whose legal wisdom they seem
to consider of a higher order than that of county or probate
judges. The consequence is that courts of probate, no matter
how able their judges may be, are held to a position inferior
to that of the circuit courts, even though the importance and
volume of their work and their standing in the communities
which they serve warrant for them, within their field, recog-
nition equivalent to that of circuit courts.
All other factors having a restrictive influence upon the
probate courts are of insignificance in comparison to the con-
trolling influence of the constitutional provisions. Were these
provisions completely general in nature it is probable that,
long ere this, probate courts would have become possessed
of wider jurisdiction and greater relative dignities within the
judicial system; and they would have been troubled less with
questions as to their authority. Even so, judicial construc-
tion of the constitutional provisions has kept pace with chang-
ing conditions and has enlarged the scope of the courts' juris-
diction; and in this process there has been resolved one doubt
after another as to their powers.
As conditions stand today, it may be said, in summary,
that the constitutional provisions are properly interpreted in
delineation of the field of enterprise in which probate courts
may engage. To that extent only are the words restrictive,
for it is definitely determined also that within that field of
enterprise the legislature may give to the courts all powers
necessary for them to have for the accomplishment of the
purposes for which they were created.
In their scope of original jurisdiction are all things per-
taining directly to the administration proper of estates. Over
personal property, as traditionally, they exercise complete
jurisdiction. Over real property, also as traditionally, they
exercise no true jurisdiction, but in departure from tradi-
tion, they exercise such powers in regard to real estate as
are necessarily incident to the administration of estates. The
nature of their proceedings is primarily statutory, thus legal,
but in the performance of their functions they exercise powers
that are equitable in nature.
In short, whatever powers the legislature chooses to grant
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to probate courts and which are necessary to their proper
functioning in the supervision and control of the administra-
tion of estates-from the date of death of the decedent to the
final dispositive act of his personal representative in effecting
the transfer of his property to whom it rightly belongs-may
be theirs.
Looking to the future, having in mind that probate courts
have reason for their being only in the performance of the
functions for which they were created, and thinking to dis-
cern a trend in the attitude of the supreme court, one may
formulate this test as to whether any specific matter is with-
in the scope of the probate courts' jurisdiction, and validly
to be acted upon by them:
Does the matter relate to the administration of an estate?
Is the matter a direct, or collateral but necessary, in-
cident to the settlement of the estate?
Is the administration proper of the estate pending before
the particular court whose jurisdiction and authority is
being questioned?
Does the statute grant to probate courts the power to act
in the matter, either expressly or by implication?
If the answer to each of these questions is in the affirmative,
the particular probate court would seem to have jurisdiction
and power to hear and determine the matter. If the answer to
any one is in the negative, the jurisdiction and power of the
particular court to hear and determine the matter is question-
able.
It is submitted that the concept of the jurisdiction and
powers of probate courts implied in the application of this
test encompasses fully all that is possible under the present
constitution and all that is required in furtherance of the
ends for which the courts were created.
